HNoMS Helge Ingstad have collided

Lol, instantly defensive remark about Norwegian military over a joke photo

Two notice from the news, that I have translated directly through google.translate, These two notice explain what they have decided, before they have announced anything:

Quote:

New frigate over the state budget
The government has decided that the money for a new government quarter (aftermatch from the Oslo bombing) and frigate repairs must be collected within the state budget, and not by extra withdrawals from the oil fund, Dagens Næringsliv (Norwegian economy news paper) reports. The proposal to raise money outside the state budget came at the government-enlargement in January.

Quote:

Navy considering selling the steel
- The Armed Forces bought HNoMS "Helge Ingstad" and equipment on board for NOK 4.3 billion.
- In the accounts, the frigate's value is written down by NOK 2.2 billion.
- At the same time, they write that it is difficult to determine the value exactly before they have a condition report in place. They expect it to be ready by the end of April.
- They are also saying: "It should be considered, whether parts of the frigate can be used for the remaining vessels, or whether it is possible to sell the steel"

For me it looks like they have decided, HNoMS Roald Amundsen and HNoMS Maud is operating with double crew, to compensate for the loss of the frigate. The disadvantage of this is that HNoMS Roald Amundsen will wear out faster than planned. for me, since the class is close to it's half life (all frigates are going into MLU in the next few year), I would have considered push forward future frigate program a little bit, shorten the career for the frigates and sell them to a NATO member, It would be to expensive to operate to totally different class of frigate for Norway. But nah. will anyway be interesting to see what they decide to do.

my little rambling is over, boys!

the report on the frigate hull have come in:

Apparently they have managed to lift the frigate without damaging the hull or bend it. it's in perfect condition, except some "scratches!"

They have also managed to save some of the electronics. Navanti recommend replacing the main engine, it's possible to get the old engine working again, but they recommend replacing due to you would then get a guarantee on the engines.

The final report will come before summer and be used as a part of the decision making on what to do next.

on Wednesday the latest update on HNoMS HI will be released to the media, but documents one of the news page have managed to get hold of, say the cost of repairing the frigate can cost as much as 1.4 billion,- US dollar (1.3 billion,- EURO). building a new would be cheaper and building a new class would be even cheaper.

Originally the frigate costed 490+- million,- US dollar (2009)

Now the report from Norwegian "accident investigation board" have come out. the report is long as a year, but I'll try to make it short. I could write a book out of this report, But short version, there is a lot of psychology in to the picture of this, specially on the frigate.

The short version is that there are no one factor that are at fault, but it is multiple factors that applies to this accident. There is 5 main things that went wrong:

1. The crew of the frigate didn't realize what they saw, was a tankship

- Around 15 minutes before the accident, was the crew change on the bridge.
- During the crew exchange, both the outgoing and incoming duty officer, saw that there was a luminous object at the Sture terminal in Øygarden.
- They thought what they saw was part of the Sture terminal, or something else that had nothing to say to the voyage.
- They did not realize that it was a 250 meter long tanker, which was getting ready to depart from the quay and straight towards them, loaded with oil.

2. The frigate sailed without AIS
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- AIS deactivated when traveling in congested water, but Helge ingstad is also equipped with Kongsberg warship-AIS (it's a encrypted AIS) this one would send out an alarm if something is getting close, it was also deactivated.

3. The traffic center forgot to plot the frigate
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- Just over an hour and a half before the collision, the warship sailed into the operating area of the Fedje Navigation Center.
- They called Fedje as they are supposed to do, and said they were coming in from the north.
- What the traffic operators at Fedje was supposed to do, was to plot the vessel name and other information about the ship on the radar so that they could follow it even if it did not send an AIS signal.

They forgot.

- Thus, the traffic operator could not respond to "Sola TS" when he asked which vessel was coming at them at full speed.

4. The tanker deck light made it impossible to see the lanterns
[ img ]

- As the "Sola TS" departed from the quay, powerful floodlights lit up the entire giant deck. The ship was going out into open water, and the crew needed light to clear their "equipment" and make the deck clear for travel.
- The powerful floodlights made it difficult for incoming vessels to see the lanterns, the safest way to recognize a vessel.
- When the pilot tried to signal to the oncoming frigate that there was danger going on with a so-called aldis lamp, no one on the bridge saw it, for the same reason.

5. The bridge crew on the frigate had too little experience
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- The officer on duty of the warship had had nine months of training before being cleared as a commander... seven months before the accident.
- Among the six people he brought with him on the bridge was a training officer under training and five enlisted.
- According to the AIBN, the lack of experience among the crew on the bridge helped them not to change their understanding of the situation:
They had decided that the luminous object, which was in fact "Sola TS", was not something they needed to take into account .

- in addition there is also talk about fatigue among the crew after the big NATO exercise that was held in Norway just then.

video that have been posted, based on surveillance video footage from TS Sola + crew explanation
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cRazvXwZQKk
https://www.bt.no/nyheter/lokalt/i/OpX1 ... wsource=cl

But the main culprit is:

Quote:

misconception of the situation of the bridge crew on HNoMS Helge Ingstad

It's a bit psychology in this: when you have decided on something "is", it's hard to realize something that "is", "isn't"!

Quote:

- To understand the accident, you do not get beyond the concept of situational understanding and "confirmation bias" - that is, the first opinion confirms itself as a fact, says department head Dag S. Liseth of the State Accident Investigation Board

Thus the frigate continued to travel at 17 knots and had focus on 3 smaller ships heading north, plotting a course, keeping them to port at safe distance. At the same time "Sola TS" due to it size decide to go a more direct rout out than normal procedure... that is to cross the "traffic sone" and first then turn on to the correct course. But at the same time a tank ship as big as Sola TS, doesn't really want to cross a fjord due to it size and difficulty at move/turn and get up at speed.

side note: The Helmsman on Helge Ingstad did saw and realize that those lights was Sola TS. but as a helmsman he has his own task. He believed that the lockout had informed the duty officer on the bridge. He clearly believed the crew and officers had full control of the situation.... this was 13 minutes before the accidents. He didn't realize that the bridge crew and officer believed that Sola TS wasn't moving. At the same time the two officer on the bridge at the moment was standing at the radar screen, discussing if what they saw was a ship or just the terminal...

The Navy says that they have come to the same conclusion as the Transport investigation board. And they are changing many of there routine and how they train up crews and officers. They says, this will change the Navy.

Okay an update, a bit late update. The investigation is still going, although most of it is done and several lawsuits have been issued are planned to issued or being talked about.

What have happend up to now:

In December it was decided that 3 of 4 reminding frigate is not allowed to sail, it includes the 4th one also, but it's on an exercise in England. There is many reason for this:
- Navy was heavily criticized, especially in reports from the Accident Investigation Board
- they Basically lost there certification and to become ready important task in February they need new sailing certificates and DNV GL approves them
- The Navy is in reorganization, due to lessons they toke from the accident with HNoMS Helge Ingstad.
- Improve the quality on mainly: technical status and maintenance

There was several reports from several channels:
- reports from officers, warning that there are still standing inexperienced crew on the bridge today as during the incident
- there was found problem with the propellers on "all" frigates: bolts that came loose, which were to hold the propeller blades on the frigates firmly. on for example HNoMS Fridtjof Nansen was several locking fasteners for bolts that are to hold the propeller blades firmly and fast, gone! The "rope guard" was also barely hanging on! (and this is from the last maintenance they was on, before the accident)
- Captains have refused to sail because they believed the safety of the vessels was not good enough.
- At the same time, the Norwegian Navy received a draft of the AIBN's new report on the HNoMS Helge Ingstad accident. It will be presented in spring and will cover everything that happened from the collision until the rescue work was completed.
- The report states that several new, serious weaknesses have been discovered on the frigate class, that have not been known to the public.

two fins was categorized as serious.

1. When the AIBN tested the hatches on the aft mooring deck after the HNoMS Helge Ingstad accident, it was discovered that one of the hatches could not withstand the water pressure it was supposed to. The hatch is also used to release the ships' towing sonar. That they use to track submarines.
- it was spot welded and equipped with sealant...

2. When HNoMS Helge Ingstad crashed, the bilge system was operated from a control room on the ship. But several valves on the bilge system were in the wrong position. It sucked air instead of water. When the power went out, the valves could not be controlled from the control room. Several of them were also covered with gratings. To remove them manually, tools were needed. The fact that the bilge system worked poorly, put the crew in a difficult situation.
- The gratings over the valves have now been removed.

Quote:

Navy confirms the information that there is a critical shortage of key roles such as Captains, navigators and chief engineers.

- Previously, we could pick up people from gyms. If I needed a substitute. says captain Larsson.

- We lack experienced navigators. It makes us vulnerable when people are sick, on courses or on leave. It increases the load when key personnel on one vessel have to be substitutes on another, says head of education Gisle Bjørsvik.

- After the Ingstad accident, we have thoroughly reviewed the requirements for competence of the navigators. As a result, we now have a deficit of people who can fill these gaps, he says.

- In the Navy, we can not get an experienced machinist from outside. We must educate them ourselves, provide military expertise. It takes ten years, says technical manager Åge Vetaas.

Then it was all the free time that accumulates
- There is good recruitment at the moment. We have few vacancies. But we do not get enough people in the key positions. And we must be careful not to over-consume those we have today. We must not compromise with the working environment, which we otherwise succeed so well with, says the boss himself, Rune Andersen.

- Last year we held a submarine commander course. No one passed. Still, we will not lower the requirements, he says.

Getting qualified people to stay is a key point.

- If we succeed in getting people to stay longer in the positions, the "rpm" will go down a bit for the entire organization, says Trond Gimmingsrud.

A common sigh of relief is that it accumulates with free time. As the law says that employees must be allowed to take out. It happens when officers on the bridge have to go straight from one ship to another, so that the new one can sail. And when technical personnel who should have had time off after a cruise must stay at the base to supervise the maintenance that follows.

Quote:

Time flies.

- We will reach the goal with what has the highest priority. The errors that must be corrected for the ships to be able to sail again, says technical manager Åge Vetsaas.

- But we can not clear the table. "Clean-up" will be the key word for this whole year, he says.

- Some errors, or deviations, have been given the status of very critical. It prohibits sailing. But many others are far less critical. It can be about painting and lubricating hinges, says Knut Stensland from the workshop side.

This do also affect all ships in the Navy. But as the commanding officer said, if there is a need and a situation, we can leave port almost right away.

[ img ]

A picture no one want to see, a to early end of an carrier of in interesting frigate design. a ship that replaced Norway's answer to submarines nightmare or NATO's crazy frigate of Oslo class, that always loved to operate between islands at high speed!

Perhaps it's time Norwegian navy reflect a little on the difference of operating a 2000 ton, small and compact vessel at high speed, close to land And a 5000+ ton and almost double as big (volume) close to land... "it's no MTB"

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BTW, it look like the frigate is bend a little bit...

R.I.P Helge Ingstad.
A sad end to a good ship.
Hopefully lessons learned will not be forgotten and adjusted to.
As i read captains refused to sail, and they still didnt do so. Good lads!
My navy's commanders will never say that, it would hurt their career.

_________________
Fryssian AU with Lt.Maverick 114
viewtopic.php?f=14&t=9802&p=193331#p193331
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Embarked on: HNLMS Karel Doorman A833
To do list:
-Zeven Provincien class cruiser
-Joint support ship all sides
-F124 Sachsen class frigate
-F125 Baden-Württemberg class frigate
-Clemencau class aircraft carrier
-Zeven provincien class frigate
-Poolster class AOR
-Amsterdam class AOR
-Minas Gerais aircraft carrier

That's a real shame, no one wants to see a ship scrapped. Hopefully a new ship is on the way.

Shipbucket

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